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ABSTRACT: With the passage of its 'Sustainable Groundwater Management Act' (SGMA), California devolved both 
authority and responsibility for achieving sustainable groundwater management to the local level, with state-level 
oversight. The passage of SGMA created a new political situation within each groundwater basin covered by the 
law, as public agencies were tasked with self-organizing to establish local Groundwater Sustainability Agencies 
(GSAs). This research examines GSA formation decisions to determine where GSAs formed, whether they were 
formed by a single agency or a partnership, and whether agencies chose to pursue sustainable groundwater 
management by way of a single basin-wide organization or by coordinating across multiple organizational 
structures. The research then tests hypotheses regarding the relative influence of control over the resource, 
control over decision making, transaction costs, heterogeneity and institutional bricolage on GSA formation 
decisions. Results indicate mixed preferences for GSA structure, though a majority of public water agencies 
preferred to independently form a GSA rather than to partner in forming a GSA. Results also suggest GSA 
formation decisions are the result of overlapping and interacting concerns about control, heterogeneity, and 
transaction costs. Future research should examine how GSA formation choices serve to influence achievement of 
groundwater sustainability at the basin scale. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The continuing and accelerating trend of groundwater overuse is a problem of global scope and 
consequence (Wada et al., 2010; Famiglietti, 2014). Despite their significance, groundwater resources 
are commonly overused and poorly managed, if at all (Foster et al., 2013; Hoogesteger and Wester, 
2015). Addressing groundwater challenges requires the development of effective governance, yet 
establishing effective structures and processes is complex and difficult (Feitelson, 2003; Wester et al., 
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2011). Top-down imposition of governance is often met with resistance by groundwater users and 
other local-level stakeholders (Ashley and Smith, 1999; Llamas and Martínez-Santos, 2005). Local 
management by groundwater users themselves receives greater support (Schlager, 2007; Hoogesteger 
and Wester, 2015), yet where jurisdictional boundaries do not align with groundwater basin 
boundaries, management decisions may not account for the full impacts of groundwater use across the 
basin (Folke et al., 2007). 
In California, state-level attempts for more stringent groundwater management have met with 
limited success, in part because the politics of groundwater governance in California has always 
featured opposition to state-level groundwater policy making and management (Helweg and Gardner, 
1979; Bachman et al., 1997; Hedges, 2010). In 2014, with the adoption of the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act (SGMA), California undertook a novel approach to overcoming the political tensions 
inherent in developing new systems for groundwater governance. SGMA (described further in Section 
2) devolves authority and responsibility for achieving sustainable groundwater management to the local 
level, mandating the establishment of local Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs). GSAs are then 
required to develop and implement Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs). The jurisdictional 
boundaries of GSAs are not required to match basin1 boundaries, yet where multiple GSAs formed in a 
basin, SGMA requires them to coordinate their sustainability planning and management to achieve 
sustainability at the basin scale. 
The passage of SGMA shifted the locus of politics from state-local to local-local, creating a new 
political situation within each groundwater basin covered by the law. Decision makers within local 
government units – both general-purpose local governments such as cities and counties and special-
purpose local governments such as local water districts – faced a sequence of three interrelated 
political choices. The first choice was whether to reach for control of decision making by forming a GSA. 
Choosing to form a GSA brought additional power authorized by SGMA, but also obligations to develop 
and implement plans, institute extensive monitoring and reporting practices, and undertake the 
sensitive and controversial tasks of limiting groundwater use in areas where groundwater users have 
been accustomed to pumping without restrictions (Cal. Water Code §10725 – 32). Choosing not to form 
a GSA raised the prospects that some other local government within the basin would do so, or, if no 
local unit within the basin sought GSA status, that the state would intervene (Cal. Water Code §10733 – 
36). The second choice, for those local governments that considered forming GSAs, was whether to act 
alone in doing so or to enter into a partnership with one or more other local governments within a 
groundwater basin to form a multi-agency GSA. The third choice was whether to form a GSA whose 
jurisdiction corresponded with the recognized boundaries of the groundwater basin. Given the 
requirement to achieve groundwater sustainability at the basin scale, this choice entails the decision 
whether to negotiate future groundwater politics within a single organizational structure or when 
coordinating across organizations. 
Our research investigates the choices made in the formation of GSAs. Specifically, we examine 
whether water agencies and districts within a groundwater basin responded to SGMA’s mandate by i) 
forming a basin-wide GSA or forming multiple GSAs at other scales that will have to coordinate on 
basin-level planning and actions later; ii) individually forming a GSA or forming a GSA through 
intergovernmental partnerships such as joint-powers agreements or memoranda of 
understanding/agreement. We then draw upon the literature on regional governance, institutional 
                                                          
1
 The term 'basin' can apply both to a surface water or a groundwater watershed/catchment. Throughout the document, the 
term 'basin' refers specifically to the boundaries of a groundwater system. Under SGMA, surface water rights and management 
systems are unchanged. However, in planning for groundwater sustainability, GSAs are required to consider and avoid 
undesirable impacts on interconnected surface water supplies.   
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collective action, institutional design, and inter-organizational coordination, in order to identify and 
examine possible explanations for GSA formation choices. 
The topic of effective governance and policy at multiple and overlapping scales (Cumming et al., 
2006; Termeer et al., 2010), including how organizations in multi-level governance structures 
coordinate policy goals, instruments, and implementation (Marks and Hooghe, 2004; Freeman and 
Rossi, 2012; Peters, 2013; Thomann and Sager, 2017) is of acute intellectual and practical concern. 
While different inter-organizational coordination structures are more likely to be effective in some 
contexts over others (Alexander, 1995; Mandell and Steelman, 2003; Provan and Kenis, 2008), to date 
there has been no research that examines which structures the organizations would select for 
themselves. Analysis of GSA formation under SGMA will help develop new understandings about which 
institutional structures are preferred for achieving groundwater sustainability and under what 
circumstances. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the SGMA’s provisions and 
implementation processes. Section 3 reviews pertinent literature on institutional design, regional 
governance, and inter-organizational coordination, and develops hypotheses about GSA formation 
choices. Section 4 describes our data collection and analysis methods. Section 5 describes the GSAs that 
formed. Section 6 analyzes GSA formation in relation to our hypotheses. Section 7 concludes with a 
discussion of implications as well as future research. 
THE SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT ACT 
Groundwater management in California occurs within a complex legal and institutional environment. 
The right to use groundwater is based on common law, guided by a series of court precedents, and 
treated separately from surface water use. Prior to SGMA, the regulation of groundwater use, where it 
has existed at all in California, has occurred at the local level, within a context of state policies and 
programmes to address water quality, surface water use, watershed management, water resources 
planning, infrastructure and other topics related to management (Brown, 2015). While state 
government control over surface water use has been extensive, groundwater management in California 
has been local, performed by a variety of public and private entities. 
On several occasions over the past 30 years, state government in California has tried to enable and 
incentivize local-level agencies and entities to engage in planning and regulation of groundwater 
resources.2 The state has enacted legislation granting local water agencies the authority to engage in 
groundwater planning (Assembly Bill 3030), provided funding for projects contingent upon 
groundwater planning (Senate Bill 1938), and provided funding for locally initiated Integrated Regional 
Water Management (IWRM) processes (Conrad, 2015). These state policy efforts to stimulate local 
action on groundwater planning and management were partially successful – 119 groundwater 
management plans (hereafter, pre-SGMA groundwater management plans) cover 20% of the state, 
(Department of Water Resources, 2015) and many local governments participated in IRWM processes 
to promote various water resource projects. On the other hand, local action remained voluntary and 
highly uneven across the state (Sandino, 2005). Also, none of these statutes or programmes authorized 
local agencies to determine, allocate, or restrict groundwater pumping rights. 
In the Autumn of 2014, the California legislature passed and Governor Jerry Brown signed the 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).3 With a few exceptions, the law required that local 
governments in the groundwater basins that have been identified by the California Department of 
Water Resources as 'high- or medium-priority' establish Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) by 
                                                          
2
 For a detailed review of California Groundwater Law and Policy see Brown (2015) 
3
 For a detailed account of the development and adoption of SGMA see Leahy (2015). 
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June 30, 2017.4 GSAs must develop and implement Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs), 
implementation of which must result in attainment of sustainable management within 20 years. Failure 
of local efforts to meet those requirements can result in the state government, via the State Water 
Resources Control Board, intervening to manage the basin (Cal. Water Code §10735-36) 
SGMA allowed any local public agency with water management, water supply, or land use 
responsibilities to become a GSA, or to be part of a GSA in combination with one or more other 
qualified local agencies (Cal. Water Code §10723). GSAs could thus be formed by public water 
agencies/districts, counties, municipalities, or combinations thereof (e.g. through the establishment of 
a joint-powers agency or similar structure). Where multiple GSAs form within a basin, SGMA requires 
they either work together to develop a single groundwater sustainability plan (GSP) for the entire basin, 
or coordinate in developing and implementing their individual GSPs to avoid undesirable results. GSAs 
in a basin must use the same groundwater data in their GSPs, develop procedures for information 
exchange, and describe how their plans, implemented together, satisfy the requirements of SGMA (Cal. 
Water Code §10727.6). Thus, the political decision of where and how to establish a GSA is complicated: 
on the one hand, any local public agency with water or land use authority could be a GSA, but on the 
other hand, planning and achieving groundwater sustainability will be assessed in terms of basin 
boundaries. Local governments faced the dilemma of going their own way in order to maximize control 
over decision making yet having to organize at the groundwater basin scale to meet state policy goals. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW AGENCIES FOR GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE 
Theorizing institutional formation 
As explained above, SGMA requires the formation of GSAs, yet allots discretion in GSA institutional 
design. The public agencies tasked with forming GSAs had the option of operating independently or 
joining together in partnerships, and could choose to form a single GSA that spans a groundwater-basin 
or could choose to form multiple GSAs within a basin. While it is likely that no single governance 
structure will work everywhere (Conrad et al., 2016), institutional design choice will influence the 
effectiveness of the GSAs (Kiparsky et al., 2017). 
The simultaneous establishment of hundreds of new governing agencies is a distinctive 
phenomenon, for which research on institutions and governance does not provide matching examples. 
Scholarly work examining agency creation (including strategic choice and structural choice), 
institutional collective action and regional or other intergovernmental coordination, and incremental or 
path-dependent institutional development (bricolage) has generally studied and theorized about either 
(i) the creation of one or a few agencies at a time, or (ii) comparisons of agencies or regional structures 
that were established at different times through varying processes (Child, 1972; Moe, 1991; Macey, 
1992; Wood and Bohte, 2004; Christensen and Nielsen, 2010; Cleaver, 2012). Despite extensive 
research on the topic, "there is still no consensus on… what variables are the main drivers for solving 
collective-action problems related to water" (Lubell and Balazs, 2018: 587). Nevertheless, we can draw 
upon these previous studies and attempts at theorizing, with the aims of synthesizing elements of an 
explanation for the patterns of GSA formation, and developing some testable hypotheses. 
                                                          
4
 The initial basin prioritization designated 127 basins as high- or medium-priority.  However, SGMA included a basin-boundary 
modification process that allowed local-level agencies to request the revision of basin boundaries when scientific information 
on the geologic or hydrologic conditions indicates the basin boundaries merit redefinition, or, in limited cases, where 
modification of the boundary due to institutional jurisdictional arrangements will allow the basin to be more sustainably 
managed. Basin boundary modifications in 2016 led to the subdivision of some of the 127 high- or medium-priority 
boundaries, resulting in 135 high- and medium-priority basins. For more information see 
www.water.ca.gov/Programs/Groundwater-Management/Bulletin-118/Basin-Boundary-Modifications 
Water Alternatives - 2018  Volume 11 | Issue 3 
Milman et al.: Local groundwater governance in California Page | 462 
Scholarly work on strategic choice (as it was called in Child, 1972) and structural choice (as it has 
been called beginning with Moe, 1991) emphasizes that the choice of forming an organization – in this 
case, a GSA – is influenced not only by considerations of which kind of organization would best 
accomplish the stated policy goals (optimality), but also, and perhaps more so, by considerations of 
control. Thus the organized interests participating in the agency formation decisions will seek designs 
that protect their influence within and over the agency in the, often uncertain, future (Macey, 1992; 
Wood and Bohte, 2004). 
Scholarly work on institutional collective action (e.g. Feiock, 2007), regional governance (e.g. Gerber 
and Gibson, 2009) and intergovernmental coordination (e.g. Peters, 2015) ascribe decisions whether to 
establish collaborative arrangements as the outcome of a weighing of the benefits of regional 
coordination versus its costs. Collaboration can lead to real gains, through the sharing of resources and 
knowledge, increased access to resources, and/or through improved operational efficiencies, including 
economies of scale, although these benefits do not always manifest themselves or may be unevenly 
distributed (Peters 2013). Further, the costs of regional coordination include not only its associated 
financial costs and benefits, but also the potential political risks and losses from regional decision 
making and the transaction costs of coordinating with other local governing bodies (Feiock, 2007). 
The political costs of coordination identified in research on institutional collective 
action/coordination primarily include the loss of local control that derives from being part of a regional 
decision-making process that includes others’ interests. Local-level actors may view shifts in control 
resulting from coordination as limiting their ability to act in the best interest of their constituencies 
(Schafer, 2016) and as reducing their autonomy. This reluctance to enter into regional governance 
arrangements has been described as 'defensive localism'. (Barron and Frug, 2005). Concerns about 
autonomy and control over decision making are more likely to occur where there is greater 
heterogeneity across local-level actors, either in their interests or in the resources, capacities, or 
political positioning that influence their power over decision making (Feiock, 2007; Kwon and Feiock, 
2010). 
Beyond potential political costs, there are real resource costs to institutional collective action. 
Forming a new institution and operating it requires time and effort to meet, communicate, and make 
decisions, among other tasks (Feiock, 2013). These transaction costs are higher when coordinating 
across diverse or heterogeneous interests, larger groups, and larger geographic expanses (Peters, 1998; 
Feiock, 2007; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Kwon and Feiock, 2010). Transaction costs are lower where 
norms, trust, and existing institutional structures and networks facilitate interactions (Booher and 
Innes, 2002; Blatter, 2003; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Brondizio, Ostrom and Young, 2009) 
Research on incremental institutional change – characterized as 'bricolage' (Cleaver, 2012; Merrey 
and Cook, 2012) or as path dependence (Pierson, 2000) – posits that, rather than making institutional 
design choices anew, actors tend to continue previous choices by starting with, borrowing from, and/or 
adding on to existing structures (Neef, 2009; Merrey and Cook, 2012). Institutional change is 
incremental because "existing institutions are path-dependent, creating fairly stable norms and 
behaviours that are difficult to transform to a new way of interaction" (Lubell and Balazs, 2018: 578). 
Decision makers are likely to gravitate toward and repeat or amend previously established structures or 
agreements rather than design new ones (Gulati, 1995). Thus how institutions evolve, including the 
form of bricolage that occurs, will be the result of the saliency, capacity, and agency of existing 
institutions and how they are adapted or reconstructed to meet current needs (Cleaver and De Koning, 
2015). 
Synthesizing and hypothesizing 
While the research described above employs multiple theoretical frameworks for understanding 
institutional formation, similarities exist between those theoretical frameworks and their differences 
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are not incompatible. To examine the decisions made by local governments as they formed GSAs, and 
thus the institutional structures through which future groundwater sustainability planning and 
implementation will occur, we bring the aforementioned theoretical frameworks together in a set of 
hypotheses and identify potential quantitative metrics that can be used to test these hypotheses (See 
Table 1). Hypotheses 1 and 2 reflect the motivations of control and autonomy found in both the 
structural choice and the institutional collective action literatures. Hypothesis 3 reflects the rational-
choice calculations of the pros and cons of forming new institutions found in the institutional collective 
action literature. Hypothesis 4 reflects findings from the institutional collective action literature about 
how heterogeneity can contribute to concerns about control as well as to increased transaction costs. 
Hypothesis 5 reflects the position that institutional formation entails incremental building upon existing 
structures, norms and processes. These hypotheses also match many of the factors identified as 
influencing the choice of GSA jurisdiction in the eight basins examined in Conrad et al.’s (2016) analysis 
of the early stages of GSA formation. 
METHODS 
To address the research questions, we adopted a mixed-methods approach that combines information 
on GSAs, the physical and social characteristics of groundwater basins, and pre-SGMA water 
management institutions. Data on GSAs was obtained from formal GSA formation filings posted on the 
SGMA GSA Portal (CA DWR, 2017b) as of September 1, 2017. Data on the physical and social 
characteristics of groundwater basins and pre-SGMA water management institutions was obtained 
from California Department of Water Resources datasets, the American Community Survey, and the 
National Land Use Database. Additional details on these datasets and how they were applied to the 
groundwater basins are included in the Appendix. 
A two-step process was used to test the hypotheses regarding the factors influencing decisions 
about whether to form a single basin-wide GSA or multiple GSAs within a basin. First, for each 
hypothesis, each metric was tested individually to determine whether that metric is statistically 
different between basins with a single basin-wide GSA and basins with multiple GSAs. Next, a 
multivariate regression was performed with all of the variables identified as statistically significant in 
order to examine how the combination of hypothesized factors jointly influenced whether a single 
basin-wide or multiple GSAs formed in the basin. 
To test the difference between basin types, for each hypothesized metric, a generalized linear model 
(GLM) with a binomial distribution (logit-function) was estimated. This model predicted a dependent 
variable of 0 = formation of a single basin-wide GSA and 1 = formation of multiple GSAs within the 
basin, with the hypothesized metric as the only independent variable. P-values of the estimated 
coefficient for the independent variable indicate whether or not that variable is statistically significant. 
This method produces results similar to a t-test between two groups, yet allows for a non-normal 
distribution of variables. 
Prior to conducting the multivariate regression analysis, variables identified as statistically significant 
between the basin types were tested for high correlations. As the variables were not highly correlated,5 
they could be combined in a multivariate regression. The variables were then standardized by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. A multivariate generalized linear model 
(GLM) with a binomial distribution (logit-function) was estimated. This model predicts a dependent 
variable of 0 = formation of a single basin-wide GSA and 1 = formation of multiple GSAs using multiple 
independent variables. In this model, the statistical significance of each variable is reflected by the p-
value for its estimated coefficient. 
                                                          
5
 Only two sets of variables are correlated at r > 0.6.  Number of Water Agencies/Total Population (r = 0.64) and Percent land 
changed to developed/percent total land cover change (r = 0.88).  
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Table 1. Hypotheses and metrics used to test the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Metrics for testing 
#1  Control over resources: Where the potential for competition over the use or allocation of the resource is 
higher, local-level actors will choose to form multiple GSAs within a basin in order to retain greater control over 
the resource 
1a) Multiple GSAs are more likely to form in basins with a 
higher number of potential water users 
 Population  
 Number of groundwater wells 
1b) Multiple GSAs are more likely to form in basins where 
groundwater has a greater role in the economy 
 % of water supplied by groundwater 
 Portion of employment in highly water-
dependent industries 
 % land cover agriculture 
#2  Control over decision making: Where the positions of stakeholders within the basin are expected to change, 
local level actors will choose to form multiple GSAs within a basin in order to retain greater control over decision 
making 
2a) Multiple GSAs are more likely to form in basins with 
greater growth in the number of potential water users 
 % Population Growth  
2b) Multiple GSAs are more likely to form in basins where 
there have been recent changes in the types of water 
users 
 % of land converted into developed 
 % of land converted into agriculture 
 % change in any land cover 
#3  Transaction costs
6
: Where immediate transaction costs of forming a basin-wide GSA are higher, local-level 
actors will choose to form multiple GSAs in order to delay the transaction costs of coordination to the future 
3a) Multiple GSAs are more likely to form in basins with a 
greater number of agencies eligible to form GSAs 
 Number of counties 
 Number of public water agencies 
3b) Multiple GSAs are more likely to form in basins that 
extend across a greater geographic area 
 Groundwater basin area 
#4  Heterogeneity: Where there is greater diversity across water users, and thus greater potential differences in 
perspectives about the nature of the groundwater problem or how to solve it, local-level actors will choose to 
form multiple GSAs within a basin in order to both reduce transaction costs and increase autonomy.  
4a) Multiple GSAs are more likely to form in basins where 
there is a greater diversity of water users 
 Land Cover Diversity Index7 
 Racial Diversity Index 
#5  Bricolage: Local-level actors will build on the existing governance pathways within the basin rather than 
forging new ones 
5a) A single basin-wide GSA will form in basins where one 
agency’s jurisdiction covers a large portion of the basin 
 % of basin covered by largest water agency 
5b) A single basin-wide GSA is likely to form when one 
pre-SGMA voluntary groundwater management plan 
covers a large portion of the basin 
 % of basin covered by any one AB3030 or 
SB1938 groundwater management plan 
5c) Multiple GSAs are likely to form when more than one 
pre-SGMA voluntary groundwater management plan 
existed.  
 Number of pre-SGMA groundwater 
management plans 
                                                          
6
 As perceptions of whether transaction costs are relatively low or high may be influenced by actorsʼ resources and capacity, 
we included basin-scale income, education, and poverty-level variables as controls. None of them was significantly associated 
with the patterns of GSA formation across basins, so they are not discussed further in this article 
7
 See the appendix for details on the diversity indices used. 
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RESULTS: LOCAL-LEVEL GSA FORMATION DECISIONS 
Overview of GSAs 
Local-level compliance with the GSA formation stage of SGMA was extremely high, with 99% of the 
high- and medium-priority basins having formed GSAs by the June 30, 2017 deadline. While GSA 
formation is related to the desire to avoid state intervention, local-level actors had additional 
motivations for forming GSAs. For example, the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency, one of 
the first agencies to declare itself a GSA, had limited jurisdictional authority to operate a groundwater 
replenishment programme (Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency, 2014). By forming a GSA 
and developing a GSP, the agency will gain greater authority to engage in basin replenishment. As 
another example, in the Upper Ventura Valley, the water provider is currently a party in a lawsuit about 
the impact of groundwater use on habitat and streamflow in the Ventura River. They hope forming a 
GSA and developing a GSP under SGMA will provide an alternative mechanism for resolving that dispute 
(Upper Ventura River Groundwater Agency, 2017). 
As of June 30, 2017, 264 GSAs8 formed across California (Figure 1a). Notably, local-level actors in 
eight low- and very-low priority basins were motivated to form GSAs, even though they were not 
required to do so. While five of those GSAs also cover parts of high- or medium-priority basins, three 
GSAs cover only low- and very-low priority basins. The Pleasant Valley Water District formed a GSA 
because district believes formation of a GSA is the best way to ensure local-level control and represent 
its landowners’ interests (Fey et al., 2016). In the Santa Margarita Basin, local-level water agencies 
expect the basin will be upgraded to medium-priority the next time DWR prioritizes basins and thus 
pre-emptively formed a GSA (Santa Margarita Groundwater Advisory Committee, 2017). The San 
Francisco Public Utilities Commission declared itself a GSA to further support its pre-SGMA 
groundwater sustainability planning (San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, 2015). The agency has 
historically sought to follow sustainability practices, and by forming a GSA it gains the authorities 
delegated to GSAs and can apply for state funding set aside for GSAs. 
These 264 GSAs cover a range of geographic scopes and institutional partnerships (Table 2). Most 
GSAs cover only part of a basin, though a number of GSAs cover either parts of multiple basins, a full 
basin, or a full basin plus a portion of another basin. In many of the basins in which multiple GSAs 
formed, the geography of governance is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation. Only 128 of 
264 (48%) GSAs cover a contiguous area. The rest of the GSAs govern areas that are geographically 
separate from one another, with 119 GSAs covering 3 or more geographically separate areas (Figure 2). 
In many instances [26 of 119 (22%)], this is because counties opted to govern regions of the basin 
where no other GSA formed. 
The majority of GSAs [190 of 264 (72%)] were formed by a single public agency rather than as a 
partnership among multiple agencies. In terms of partnerships, broadly speaking, Community Service 
Districts and Resource Conservation Districts were more likely to join partnerships when forming GSAs, 
whereas Reclamation Districts9 were more likely to form their own single-agency GSAs. Counties, cities, 
irrigation, multi-purpose, and water districts are more mixed as to whether they chose to form a single-
agency GSA versus partnering to form a multi-agency GSA. There were twelve Special Act Districts that 
SGMA explicitly authorized to form their own GSAs, and they did so (Cal. Water Code §10723). 
                                                          
8
 This analysis is based on GSAs formation notices as of July 1, 2017. Four additional GSAs filed notification between 8/17/2017 
and 12/15/2017 and are not included in this analysis.  
9
 Just before the June 30, 2017 GSA formation deadline, 13 reclamation districts in the Delta groundwater basin filed as GSAs. 
Each notice said that these reclamation districts plan to work together to form a single GSA. These districts remain listed in the 
SGMA Portal as individual agencies and are treated as such in the statistical analysis below, though they have since signed a 
Joint Powers Agreement to form the Northern Delta Groundwater Sustainability Agency (see www.ndgsa.org/about-1/). 
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Figure 1. Map of GSA formation by  a) GSA structure, b) number. 
   
Note: a) By Geographic and institutional scope of GSAs across all basins: Colours indicate the portion of a basin or basins 
covered by a GSA. Cross-hatching indicates whether the GSA was formed by a single-agency or by a partnership across multiple 
agencies. GSAs in all basins (including low and very-low priority basins) are depicted. b) By Number of GSAs formed per basin 
across high- and medium-priority basins: Colours indicate the number of GSAs within a basin. Cross-hatching indicates 
locations covered by a groundwater adjudication. Only high- and medium-priority basins are depicted. 
Figure 2. Three examples of basins in which GSAs are comprised of non-contiguous areas or have highly 
irregular boundaries. 
a) Tahoe Valley Basin              b) Salinas Valley    c) Sacramento Valley 
 
Note: Colours denote the boundaries of the GSAs within the basin. a) Two GSAs formed in the Tahoe Valley Basin; b) Four GSAs 
formed in the Salinas Valley, one of these GSAs also covers a portion of a neighbouring basin; c) Six GSAs formed in the 
Sacramento Valley, two of these GSAs also cover portions of neighbouring basins. Figures are not drawn to scale. 
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Types of GSA member agencies **    
City 36 48 84 
Community Services District 5 15 20 
County 32 50 82 
Flood Control District 2 2 4 
Indian Tribe 0 1 1 
Irrigation District 21 21 42 
Multi-Purpose District 8 8 16 
Other*** 0 11 11 
Reclamation District 26 6 32 
Resource Conservation District 1 7 8 
Special Act District 12 0 12 
Water District 47 53 100 
* 
Two GSAs, Sacramento County and Tulare County, were filed to cover unmanaged areas within the county. Their filings do 
not indicate the exact geographic area they cover; therefore they are not included in the statistics for these rows. 
** 
Member agencies are the public entities eligible to form a GSA who joined together through a Memorandum of 
Understanding or Joint Powers Agreement to form the GSA. 
*** 
Other includes the following types of districts: Drainage, Stormwater, Water Conservation, and Water Storage.  
While single-agency GSAs are all public agencies and decisions are made by their existing governing 
bodies, 28 of 74 (36%) multi-agency GSAs include some non-member voting partners, generally non-
public entities that were not eligible to form a GSA such as private water companies, landowners who 
pump groundwater outside of a water district, representatives of environmental organizations, and 
members of the general public. For example, the Arroyo Seco GSA included a local mutual (private) 
water company as a voting member while the Mound Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency 
included an agricultural and an environmental voting representative. The governing documents of 20 of 
74 (27%) multi-agency GSAs also create, or allow for the creation of, advisory committees that include 
non-public entities. This avenue for participation of interested parties in GSA governance is also open to 
single-agency GSAs, though information on advisory committees is not included in the formation 
notices of single-agency GSAs. 
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Further, many multi-agency GSAs [35 of 74 (47%)] developed provisions specifying how costs will be 
allocated across member agencies. In some cases, costs are shared equally, though in many others, 
allocation formulas take into account acres covered, amount of groundwater pumped, or number of 
wells. In some instances, this potential for cost sharing influenced formation decisions. For example, in 
Yolo County, despite having vocalized strong concerns and desires for autonomy, several very small 
reclamation districts decided to join a basin-wide GSA that was prepared to take on the tasks of writing 
grant proposals and hiring consultants to prepare a basin-wide GSP (Conrad et al., 2018). In the Santa 
Rosa Plain, Petaluma Valley and Sonoma Valley basins, local-level actors decided to reduce the costs of 
developing and implementing their GSPs by sharing staff and other resources across GSAs. Sonoma 
County, which is a partner agency in each of the 3 GSAs, will serve as the coordinator (Sonoma Valley 
Groundwater Sustainability Agency, 2017). 
Coordination structure choice: Negotiating intra-local politics through single organization or 
across organizations 
Local-level organizations were split between the decision to form a single basin-wide organization that 
would plan for sustainability and negotiate intra-local politics within that organization versus forming 
multiple organizations that would have to coordinate in planning for sustainability at the basin scale 
(Table 3). Of the 135 high- and medium-high priority basins, 23 (17%) were not covered by a GSA, 
primarily because they either were covered by a prior groundwater adjudication, had filed an 
alternative plan, or consist of federal or tribal land.10 Of the remaining high- and medium-priority 
basins, 49 of 112 (44%) are entirely covered by a single GSA, 54 of 112 (48%) are covered by multiple 
GSAs, and 9 of 112 (8%) are partly covered by a GSA (Figure 1b). 
Table 3. Summary of GSA formation decisions by basin. 






Number of basins 49 63 112 
Number of GSAs within the basin 
1 GSAs 
2 or 3 GSAs 
4 to 6 GSAs 
















Types of GSAs within the basin** 












 Included in the above table are 9 basins that are partly covered and are counted as multi-GSA basins. These include 6 
adjudicated basins in which a single GSA has formed, though that GSA does not cover the entire basin and 3 basins in which 
only one GSA formed yet it does not cover the entire basin. 
** 
Not included in the above table are the 17 basins with adjudications nor the 6 basins in which no GSAs formed. 
                                                          
10
 SGMA provides the following exceptions to GSA formation in high- and medium-priority basins: GSA formation is not 
required where groundwater use rights had previously been settled via the courts in a process called 'adjudication', where 
local-level agencies submitted alternative plans prior to January 1, 2017, or over federal or tribal lands (Cal. Water Code 
§10720.7).  
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GSAs were limited to the geographic jurisdiction of the public agencies forming them. Thus, for a local-
level public agency to form a basin-wide GSA, it either had to have geographic jurisdiction across the 
entire basin or it needed to partner with other local-level agencies eligible to form a GSA. There is no 
statistical difference11 between the number of single-GSA basins in which the GSA is a partnership and 
the number of multi-GSA basins in which the GSAs formed as a partnership. In other words, local-level 
actors partnered to form basin-wide GSAs just as much as they partnered to form non-basin-wide GSAs. 
This indicates that the decision to form a single-GSA that spans the entire basin versus multiple GSAs 
that will have to coordinate sustainability planning does not appear to be related to willingness to enter 
into partnerships.12 
DETERMINANTS OF GSA FORMATION 
To test our hypotheses about the factors influencing GSA formation, we first examined differences in 
the test metrics across the basins. Basins in which a single basin-wide GSA formed are significantly 
different from basins in which multiple GSAs formed across 9 of the 20 metrics tested (see Appendix 
Table A2). A multivariate analysis using the 9 metrics identified as statistically different between basins 
with a single basin-wide GSA and basins in which multiple GSAs formed was carried out in order to 
understand how our hypotheses worked together to influence GSA formation decisions (see Appendix 
Table A3).13 
Hypothesis #1 We hypothesized that where the potential for competition over the use or allocation of 
groundwater is higher, local level actors will choose to form multiple GSAs within a basin in order to 
retain greater control over the groundwater resource. Both population and the percent of the land of 
the basin used for agriculture significantly differentiate basins in which a single basin-wide GSA formed 
and in which multiple GSAs formed. Yet the number of wells, reliance on groundwater for water supply 
and the share of employment in water-dependent industries are not significant. In the multivariate 
model, percent of land covered in agriculture is statistically significant while population is not. The 
agricultural variable has a large effect size, indicating that as the portion of the basin that is used for 
agriculture increases, there is a strong tendency to form multiple GSAs within the basin. 
As only two of the metrics associated with hypothesis 1 are significant, it cannot be concluded that 
competition over the resources is leading to the formation of multiple GSAs within the basin. The 
agricultural metric may be capturing underlying concerns of local-level actors that are not captured 
elsewhere in the model (unobserved variable bias). Within agricultural areas in California, there can be 
substantial variation in how water is used and in the institutional processes of the agencies providing 
water services (Hanak, 2011). Although the multivariate analysis controls for the number of water 
agencies and the number of counties in a basin, it may be that differences in the nature of those 
agencies and their constituencies, rather than the actual quantity of the resource itself, have affected 
the formation of multiple GSAs in highly agricultural areas. Without a dataset on agricultural users and 
on water agency governance structures, we cannot account for the impacts in the influence of those 
variables on GSA formation decisions. 
Hypothesis #2 We hypothesized that where the relative power position of stakeholders is expected to 
change, local actors will form multiple GSAs within a basin in order to retain control over decision 
making. None of the metrics used to represent potential changes in conditions (population growth and 
                                                          
11
 Chi-square test of difference χ2 = 1.0013, p-value = 0.317  
12
 While to partner or not to partner may not be a deciding factor, as examined in the regression analysis below, formation of 
a basin-wide GSA may be related to the number of partners required. 
13
 Basins not fully covered by GSAs were not included in the statistical analysis because they cannot be accurately represented 
using the binary metric of the dependent variable.  
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land cover change) vary significantly between single-GSA basins and multiple-GSA basins. This finding 
indicates change within the basin does not appear to be a driving factor influencing decision making. As 
these metrics do not differ across basins, they were not included in the multivariate analysis. 
Hypothesis #3 We hypothesized that where immediate transaction costs of forming a basin-wide GSA 
are higher, local-level actors will choose to form multiple GSAs and defer the transaction costs of 
coordination to the future. While all three of the hypothesized metrics for transaction costs (number of 
counties, number of water agencies, basin size) differed significantly between single-GSA basins and 
multiple-GSA basins, in the multivariate model, only the number of counties is significant. The fact that 
the number of water agencies and basin size are significant when tested individually but not in the 
multivariate model indicates that the number of counties, the number of water districts, and basin size 
are capturing some of the same basin characteristics. Although the variables are not highly correlated, 
basins that span more counties also tend to be larger and contain more water districts. 
The significant role of counties in GSA formation likely arises from the fact that SGMA designates 
counties as the default GSAs where no other eligible entities form a GSA (Cal. Water Code §10724). 
Multiple GSAs formed in 36 of the 50 (72%) high- and medium-priority basins that extend across more 
than one county. Further, 26 of the 32 single-agency GSAs that were formed by counties were formed 
by counties governing regions of the basin where no other GSA formed. 
The fact that basin area is not significant may reflect that transaction costs are not necessarily 
correlated with basin size. The majority of basins in which a single basin-wide GSA formed [45 of 49 
(92%)] cover areas less that 500 km2, yet 22 of the 63 basins in which multiple GSAs formed span less 
than 500 km2. This indicates that a smaller basin size is not a sufficient condition for forming a single 
basin-wide GSA. In terms of larger basins, a single basin-wide GSA formed in only three high- or 
medium-priority basins larger than 800 km2, and each of those basins has unique circumstances that 
likely affected transaction costs. One basin, Redbluff, is covered by a GSA comprised of a single agency 
that extends across all of the high- and medium priority basins in the county yet includes 
representation from all of the eligible entities (Antone, 2016). The second basin, Indian Wells Valley, is 
fully reliant on groundwater and located far from the seats of the counties it traverses. The GSA formed 
as a partnership across all of the public entities eligible to form a GSA in the basin (Cosner, 2016). In the 
third basin, Cuyama Basin, after SGMA was passed, local agricultural growers in the basin rushed to 
form a new water district that would be eligible to form a GSA in order to ensure their representation in 
the process (Swanston, 2016). This new agency partnered with the counties and the community service 
district that covers a small portion of the basin to form a GSA (Jacobs, 2018). 
Lastly, the fact that the number of water agencies is not a significant predictor of whether a single 
basin-wide GSA formed within the basin may reflect that it is not the overall number of water agencies 
that determine transaction costs, but rather other characteristics of the agencies determine the ease or 
difficulty of coordination. For example, partnerships across agencies forming GSAs (Table 2) varied by 
agency type, and even within a single type of agency (e.g. city, irrigation district, etc) some agencies 
entered into partnerships while others did not, suggesting that agency type and structure matter. 
Hypothesis #4 We hypothesized that where there is greater diversity across water users, and thus 
greater potential differences in perspectives about the nature of the groundwater problem or how to 
solve it, local-level actors will choose to form multiple GSAs within a basin in order to both reduce 
transaction costs and increase autonomy. Two metrics were used to test for the influence of 
heterogeneity on GSA formation within a basin. The land cover diversity index serves as a proxy for 
heterogeneity in the nature of water use in the basin. The portion of land covered by forested, 
grasslands, wetlands and barren land does not statistically vary between single-GSA basins and 
multiple-GSA basins. The percentage of land covered by agriculture is greater in basins with multiple 
GSAs, while the percentage of developed land is greater in basins with a single basin-wide GSA. Yet the 
diversity index, which reflects the relative amounts of the land covers in relation to one another, is not 
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significant, indicating that there are no patterns in the relative portions of agriculture and developed 
lands across the basin types. In terms of the hypothesis, this suggests differences between the relative 
amounts of developed and agricultural lands within a basin do not contribute to greater concerns about 
control or greater transaction costs. 
While land cover diversity is not a significant predictor of the decision to form multiple GSAs within a 
basin, there are examples where GSA formation decisions were driven by concerns about heterogeneity 
in the type of water user. For example, local-level actors in Placer County decided to form two GSAs in 
the portion of the county that lies in the North American Basin. One GSA is governed solely by the 
county. The other entails a partnership with the South Sutter Water District GSA. This decision was 
made in order to consolidate the agricultural stakeholders in one GSA and non-agricultural stakeholders 
in another. The two GSAs plan to work with each other and with the other GSAs in the basin to develop 
a single groundwater sustainability plan. By having separate GSAs, each group of stakeholders has a 
clear path for representation in the development and implementation of the groundwater sustainability 
plans (Personal communication, Placer County, August 20, 2016). Similar preferences for having GSAs 
representing different sets of groundwater users reportedly contributed to the formation of multiple 
GSAs in the Kings Basin (Conrad et al., 2016: 27-28) and Eastern San Joaquin Basin (Conrad et al., 2018: 
46-47). 
The racial diversity index serves as a proxy for social and cultural differences within the basin. This 
index varies across basins with a single basin-wide GSA and basins with multiple GSAs and is significant 
in the multivariate model with a large effect size. As racial diversity increases, there is a strong tendency 
to form multiple GSAs. An explanation for this trend requires further investigation. 
The racial diversity index reflects diversity across the entire population within the basin, yet GSA 
formation decisions were made by eligible public agencies serving the local population, rather than 
local-level individuals themselves. While we do not have data on the constituencies of the entities 
eligible to form GSAs, it is well documented that within California, drought has had a greater impact on 
small public water systems, especially those serving disadvantaged communities (Feinstein et al., 2017) 
and that small community water systems serving disadvantaged communities (including a large 
percentage of latino hispanic and non-hispanic people of colour) tend to have a disproportionate 
number of safe drinking act violations (Balazs et al., 2012). Thus the racial diversity index may be 
capturing capacity differences across entities eligible to form GSAs along with any concerns about 
control or increased transaction costs arising from socio and cultural differences. 
Hypothesis #5 We hypothesized that local-level actors will build on the existing governance pathways 
rather than forging new ones. The two types of basins do not vary in terms of the percentage of the 
basin covered by the largest water district nor the percentage covered by the largest pre-SGMA 
groundwater management plan. This indicates that the presence of a larger single agency or prior 
groundwater management effort did not directly lead to formation of a single basin-wide GSA. 
The number of pre-SGMA groundwater management plans varies across basins: basins in which 
multiple GSAs formed have a higher number of prior voluntary groundwater management plans than 
basins in which a single basin-wide GSA formed. Nonetheless, in the multivariate regression, the 
number of prior voluntary groundwater management plans is not statistically significant. Approximately 
70% of the area of high- and medium-priority basins were covered by a pre-SGMA groundwater 
management plan. Some areas are overlapped by multiple plans. Most of the plans do not match basin 
boundaries. Further, the boundaries of only 43 of 264 (16%) of GSAs match the boundaries of pre-
SGMA groundwater management planning, yet 7 of those GSAs fill the areas lying outside of prior 
groundwater management planning, rather than encompassing the boundaries of prior groundwater 
planning. Most local actors formed new institutional structures for groundwater planning rather than 
continuing pre-SGMA groundwater management planning efforts. It also suggests that the finding that 
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basins with multiple GSAs have more prior voluntary groundwater management plans may simply 
reflect the fact that many of those basins encompass a larger geographic expanse. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
SGMA is a novel model that seeks to overcome the challenges of developing new systems for 
groundwater governance at the state and at the local level. The legislation has struck a compromise 
between purely voluntary local management on the one hand and the imposition of a state-wide 
structure on the other. Under this compromise, local decision-makers are required to act but have 
extensive discretion over how they act. The high degree of compliance with the first phase of SGMA 
suggests that, at minimum, such a mandate can be effective in fomenting local-level formation of new 
governance systems. SGMA therefore leaves substantial room for local-level dynamics to influence 
agency formation, and we have examined several of those possible influence pathways. 
SGMA requires groundwater sustainability be achieved at the basin level. Where multiple GSAs 
formed in a basin, they must coordinate their groundwater management activities. Local actors 
complying with SGMA’s requirements have had to choose between developing a GSA to match basin 
boundaries or developing multiple GSAs within a basin and coordinating basin-wide GSP development 
and implementation across those GSAs. The basin-wide GSA option entails higher upfront transaction 
costs and navigation of the politics of control and decision making within a structured organizational 
framework. The multiple GSAs option entails higher future transaction costs and navigation of the 
politics of control and decision making across organizational frameworks. Notably, preferences 
between these options were split with almost equal numbers of basins (49 vs 54) choosing to form a 
single GSA that covers the entire basin and those choosing to form multiple GSAs within a basin. This 
split suggests the trade-offs between the two options and actors’ responses to those trade-offs vary 
with context. 
While the geography of GSA formation was equally split, local-level actors had a strong preference 
for acting independently, with 190 of 264 (72%) of the GSAs formed by a single-agency. Further, the 
fact that the prevalence of single agency vs. multi-agency GSAs does not vary across single and multi-
GSA basins indicates that the need to collaborate in forming a new agency was not the limiting factor in 
the decision to form a basin-wide GSA. 
In examining potential explanations for the decision to form a basin-wide GSA versus multiple GSAs 
in the basin, three of the variables tested in the multivariate analysis are significant predictors: 
percentage of the land for agriculture, the number of counties, and racial diversity. The significance of 
these three variables in the multivariate analysis supports our assumption that GSA formation decisions 
involve weighting multiple considerations. Even though these variables explain 39.9% of the variation 
across basins, their significance does not unequivocally confirm our hypotheses about the factors 
driving GSA formation. While these variables could be interpreted as supporting the hypotheses about 
the influence of competition for groundwater, transaction costs, and heterogeneity on the GSAs 
formation, the fact that the other variables used to test these hypotheses were not significant raises 
the prospect that those metrics reflect other processes.14 Future research employing other methods 
and analyzing different data may be able to shed light on other explanations for the significance of 
these metrics. 
                                                          
14
 Many of the theoretical drivers influencing institutional coordination decisions are non-tangible variables. The selection of 
an appropriate proxy is an innate challenge in trying to analyze complex qualitative processes using quantitative metrics. A 
strong need for future research on the topic of Inter-organizational coordination is an investigation of what metrics can best 
serve as proxies for the theoretical variables used to describe relationships and concerns of organizations. 
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Results from the multivariate model do not support our hypotheses related to change within the 
basin (control over decision making) or the presence of existing institutions (bricolage). Change within 
the basin was not significant, and rates of change in land cover and population growth across all basins 
were relatively low. While the presence of a large water agency or prior groundwater management plan 
does not appear to have served as a focal point for formation of a single basin-wide GSA, and pre-SGMA 
groundwater management plan boundaries did not correlate with GSAs boundaries, we cannot say that 
prior institutional arrangements were irrelevant to GSA formation decisions. Local-level entities eligible 
to form GSAs under SGMA all had pre-SGMA water and land management responsibilities and 
constraints. Many of those water and land responsibilities connect to other phenomena at other scales 
– surface water bodies, drinking water and wastewater distribution systems, and so on. For each of 
these local governments, GSA formation involved a choice about whether or not to operate at multiple 
scales (those of existing responsibility as well as at the basin level) as well as concerns about meeting 
those responsibilities, including about how stakeholder constituencies might interpret actions now 
aimed at the basin rather than the local-agency scale, also influenced GSA formation decisions. 
Furthermore, we did find that basins where multiple GSAs formed tended to have had multiple pre-
SGMA groundwater management plans. The vast number of single-agency GSAs, particularly in the 
multiple-GSA basins, suggests that concerns about autonomy likely were important determinants of 
GSA formation. 
In terms of the implications of GSA choices on groundwater sustainability, it is too soon to evaluate 
outcomes. In some basins, partitioning of a basin across multiple GSAs may serve to facilitate 
sustainable groundwater use. Where multiple GSAs plan to develop a joint GSP, the partitioning of the 
basin may enable local-level actors to create institutional structures that promote stakeholder buy-in, 
address the diversity of conditions and interests across the basin, and have access to localized 
knowledge and information. Further, where sub-regions within the basin are less connected to others, 
partitioning of the basin may serve to reduce the cost of groundwater sustainability planning, by 
limiting the need to coordinate to only planning aspects of the basin that are interconnected. Yet in 
other basins, partitioning of the basin across multiple-GSAs may hinder basin-level coordination, 
especially where partitioning is a reflection of competition or contention between stakeholders. Thus, 
how GSA formation will affect GSP development and implementation depends not only on whether 
multiple GSAs were formed in a basin, but why. 
The governance of groundwater will be a formidable challenge for many locations across the world 
in this century. In California, for now, figuratively speaking, the table has been set and the seats 
assigned. With many others, we wait to observe and assess how the local choices that have been made 
so far will affect the success of the effort to attain sustainable groundwater management. Continued 
study of California’s state-wide experiment in institutional creation and policy implementation will 
provide valuable insights into how local politics, organizational structures, and policy can successfully 
join together to achieve sustainability at the basin level. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable definitions and data sources 
Data used in the statistical analysis included information on the physical and social characteristics of 
groundwater basins and pre-SGMA water management institutions. The variables used in this analysis, 
the source of the data, and the method by which that data, which was available at varying units of 
analysis, was assigned to the basin-level is described in Table A1. An explanation of each aggregation 
method is given below. 
Table A1: Definitions of the variables used in the statistical analysis 
Hypothesis 
and metrics 
Explanation Source Aggregation 
method 
#1 Control over resources   
Population (log) Total population, log transformed. ACS GIS census tract 
overlay 
Wells (#) Number of wells that draw from the basin. CASGEM Basin-level data 
Water supplied by 
groundwater (%) 
The degree to which persons overlying the 
basin rely on groundwater as the primary 
source of water. 
CASGEM Basin-level data 
Portion of 
employment in highly 
water-dependent 
industries (%) 
Percentage of the civilian employed 
population 16 years and over – Agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining. 
ACS GIS census tract 
overlay 
Land covered in 
Agriculture (%) 
Percentage of land in the basin covered in 
agriculture. Includes both cultivated crops 
and pasture hay. 
NLCD GIS land use 
overlay 
#2 Control over decision making   
Population Growth 
(%) 
The rate of current and projected growth of 
the population overlying the basin. 
CASGEM Basin-level data 
Land converted to 
developed (%) 
Percentage of land in the basin that was 
transformed from any land cover to 
developed. 
NLCD GIS land use 
overlay 
2001 – 2011 
Land converted to 
agriculture (%) 
Percentage of land in the basin that was 
transformed from any land cover to 
agriculture. 
NLCD GIS land use 
overlay 
2001 – 2011 
Land undergoing any 
conversion (%) 
Percentage of land in the basin that was 
transformed from any land cover to any 
other land cover. 
NLCD GIS land use 
overlay 
2001 – 2011 
#3 Transaction Costs   
Counties (#)  Number of counties traversed by the basin. CA GIC Count 
Water agencies (#) Number of public water agencies whose 
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Geographic expanse 
(log km2)  
Area of the basin, log transformed. CA GIC Basin-level data 
#4 Heterogeneity   
Land Cover Diversity 
Index 
Heterogeneity index (see below) based on 
2011 data and calculated using seven 
categories of land cover: agriculture, barren, 
developed, forested, grassland, water, and 
wetland. Index ranges on a scale of 0 (least 
diverse) to 1.94 (most diverse) 
NLCD Heterogeneity 
metric 
Racial Diversity Index Heterogeneity index (see below) based on 
2015 data and calculated using five 
categories for race. Categories include 
Hispanic or Latino of any race, Not Hispanic 
or Latino – White alone, Not Hispanic or 
Latino – Asian alone, Not Hispanic or Latino 
– Black or African American alone, and Not 
Hispanic or Latino – All others combined. 
Index ranges on a scale of 0 (least diverse) to 
1.61 (most diverse) 
ACS Heterogeneity 
metric 
#5 Bricolage    
Portion of basin 
covered by largest 
water agency (%) 
Percentage of the basin area covered by the 
water agency that covers the largest amount 




Portion of basin 
covered by largest 
prior groundwater 
management plan (%) 
Percentage of the basin area covered by the 
pre-SGMA groundwater management plan 
(if any) that covers the largest amount of 
land area within the basin. Pre-SGMA 
groundwater management plans include any 
plan developed under AB 3030 or SB 1938 
that was filed with the California 
Department of Water Resources. Includes 
only plans from 2002 onwards, as DWR 
considers only those plans to be active. 
CA GIC GIS 
Prior groundwater 
management plans (#) 
Number of pre-SGMA groundwater 
management plans that cover any area 
within the basin. Pre-SGMA groundwater 
management plans include any plan 
developed under AB 3030 or SB 1938 that 
was filed with the California Department of 
Water Resources. Includes only plans from 
2002 onwards, as DWR considers only those 
plans to be active. 
CA GIC Count 
Data Sources: 1) ACS: American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2015); 2) CA GIC: California Groundwater Information 
Center (CA DWR 2017); 3) CASGEM: California Statewide Groundwater Elevation Monitoring Program (CA DWR 2014); 4) DWR 
Atlas: California Department of Water Resources Atlas (CA DWR 2018); 5) NLCD: National Land Cover Dataset (Homer, C.G.; et 
al., 2015) 
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GIS Census Tract Overlay: The American Community Survey (ACS) dataset uses the census tract as the 
unit of analysis. To convert this information to the basin-level, a GIS layer of the groundwater basin was 
overlain on the census tracts to determine the portion of each census tract falling within a groundwater 
basin. For each socio-economic variable, the area-weighted portion of each census tract that falls within 
a groundwater basin was then summed. This method provides an estimate that assumes the population 
is evenly distributed within a census tract. 
GIS Land Use Overlay: The National Land Cover Dataset includes raster data representing land cover in 
2011 as well as raster data indicating transformation in land cover between 2001-2011. Land cover 
within a groundwater basin was determined by overlaying a GIS layer of the groundwater basin on the 
NLDC data and calculating the percent of the basin covered by agriculture. Agriculture includes both 
cultivated crops (code = 82) and pasture hay (code = 81). Land cover change within a basin was 
determined by calculating the percent of the basin that was transformed from any land cover to 
agriculture, from any land cover to developed (codes = 21, 22, 23, or 24), and from any land cover to 
any other land cover (total change) between 2001-2011. 
Heterogeneity Metric: Land Cover Diversity and Racial Diversity were measured using Theil’s H, an 
entropy index commonly used for measuring heterogeneity within a population (Iceland, 2004; 
Hansmann and Quigley). 





   
 
Where    is the proportion of the j 
th variable for the i th group. Higher index values reflect higher 
diversity. The maximum index value will be the natural log of the number of categories. Zero values 
were replaced with 1E-10 to enable calculation of the natural logarithm. 
Results from statistical analysis 
Table A2. Differences in test metrics across single GSA and multi-GSA basins. 
Hypothesis and metrics Basins with basin-wide 
GSA 
Basins with multiple 
GSAs 
Test of  
difference 
Hypothesis and metrics Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. P-Value 
#1 Control over resources      
Population (log) 4.2 0.9 4.7 1.0 0.011
*
 
Wells (#) 2507 6882 4838 6380 0.116 
Water supplied by groundwater (%) 63.9 31.9 57.6 30.9 0.312 
Portion of employment in highly water-
dependent industries (%) 
7.4 9.8 10.5 12.2 0.168 
Land covered in Agriculture (%) 20.8 19.6 41.7 27.3 0.000
**
 
#2 Control over decision making      
Population Growth (%) 1.2 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.128 
Land converted to developed (%) 2.0 3.2 1.5 2.4 0.352 
Land converted to agriculture (%) 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.484 
Land undergoing any conversion (%) 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.7 0.467 
#3 Transaction Costs      
Counties (#)  1.2 0.6 1.9 0.9 0.000
**
 
Water agencies (#) 4.6 2.8 9.3 6.5 0.000
**
 
Geographic expanse (log km2)  2.2 0.5 2.8 0.6 0.000
**
 
#4 Heterogeneity      
Land Cover Diversity Index 1.08 0.30 0.99 0.26 0.109 
Racial Diversity Index 0.85 0.19 0.99 0.17 0.000
**
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#5 Bricolage       
Portion of basin covered by largest water 
agency (%) 
64.4 39.4 60.2 34.0 0.559 
Portion of basin covered by largest prior 
groundwater management plan (%) 
58.4 45.1 50.6 38.6 0.344 




Variable is significant at the 5% level 
** 
Variable is significant at the 1% level 
Table A3. Multivariate Analysis Results. 
 Logistic regression results 






#1 Control over resources     
Population (log) -0.553 0.410 -1.349 0.178 
Land covered in agriculture (%) 1.184 0.411 2.878 0.004*** 
#3 Transaction costs     
Counties (#)  0.888 0.445 1.993 0.046** 
Water agencies (#) 0.513 0.579 0.887 0.375 
Geographic expanse (log km2)  0.481 0.401 1.2 0.230 
#4 Heterogeneity     
Racial Diversity Index 1.278 0.406 3.145 0.002*** 
#5 Bricolage     
Prior groundwater management plans (#) 0.005 0.598 0.008 0.993 
Null deviance: 142.546 on 102 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 85.758 on 95 degrees of freedom 
McFadden’s pseudo R-square, explained percent variation = 39.8% 
* 
Coefficient represents log-odds of a unit increase in the standardized independent variable on the likelihood that multiple 
GSAs formed in a basin as compared to the formation of a single basin-wide GSA. See (Politzer-Ahles, 2016) on interpretation 
of logistic regression results. 
** 
Variable is significant at the 5% level 
*** 
Variable is significant at the 1% level 
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